




























































































































































































































X X 1 X 2 
(2) 私的財








































































































































































































1990 5044 1.35 1120 0.54 
1991 5077 0.65 1118 ー0.18
1992 5020 -1.12 1104 -1.25 
1993 5030 0.20 1103 ー0.09
1994 5054 0.48 1106 0.27 
1995 5069 0.30 1105 ー0.09






1990 608.6 1ー.01 481.0 -1.86 79.0 
1991 600.7 -1.30 470.8 2ー.12 78.4 
1992 582.4 :3.05 452.2 -3.95 77.6 
1993 569.3 -2.25 440.1 -2.68 77.3 
1994 562.1 1ー.26 432.0 -1.84 76.9 
1995 554.1 1ー.42 424.3 -1.78 76.6 




1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
千代田 134.2 128.4 122.2 115.7 103.7 
中央 183.5 178.5 173.1 154.9 146.5 
港 183.9 176.1 171.8 164.4 163.7 
新宿 227.8 216.9 203.5 192.4 180.0 
文京 97.5 94.4 92.9 91.2 83.4 
台東 148.2 141.7 134.7 128.4 119.0 
墨田 128.2 125.4 120.9 116.3 109.7 
江東 183.4 177.4 174.7 177.1 176.6 
品川 175.9 170.4 165.8 161.4 156.5 
大田 307.7 296.2 288.7 282.8 275.5 
~t 156.7 154.1 150.2 148.0 147.6 
目黒 113.4 111.1 108.8 107.9 104.7 
世田谷 335.6 335.4 334.8 336.2 330.1 
，山';えI山ヨl 150.6 146.4 143.5 140.7 133.7 
中野 130.6 127.6 123.1 119.5 115.3 
杉並 209.4 207.4 206.1 202.8 200.9 
豊島 207.0 199.1 201.4 208.6 210.5 
荒川 84.9 83.1 81.8 80.6 77.6 
板橋 224.8 216.3 208.7 208.0 203.7 
練馬 255.5 255.0 256.1 249.6 243.4 
足立 400.9 393.8 391.5 385.6 381.7 
葛飾 196.1 194.0 193.4 191.0 187.7 
江戸川 294.2 291.9 294.1 299.8 302.9 












1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
千代田 53.5 53.5 53.2 53.9 50.7 
中央 54.6 52.8 51.8 56.1 53.0 
港 68.8 68.4 68.0 69.5 66.2 
新宿 85.5 87.1 86.2 84.5 82.4 
文京 87.1 87.9 87.4 86.6 88.3 
台東 86.4 86.3 86.3 86.3 86.2 
墨田 93.1 92.6 92.6 93.3 93.6 
江東 80.9 82.6 82.0 79.0 76.5 
品川 78.7 79.6 80.3 81.1 81.2 
大田 81.7 82.4 83.0 82.8 81.7 
~t 80.0 80.3 79.6 79.1 76.2 
目黒 87.2 87.5 88.1 87.9 88.1 
世田谷 85.9 86.0 85.1 84.9 84.7 
口山Cl山口l 85.2 85.5 85.0 85.1 84.5 
中野 93.7 93.6 93.6 93.6 93.4 
杉並 90.0 91.0 91.2 92.0 91.2 
豊島 62.7 63.4 61.1 56.8 51.7 
荒川 93.8 94.7 93.4 93.8 94.3 
板橋 82.6 83.5 84.9 84.9 83.1 
練馬 87.1 86.9 86.6 88.5 89.7 
足立 56.1 56.0 55.5 56.5 55.5 
葛飾 84.4 84.1 84.1 83.3 82.1 
江戸川 70.1 71.0 70.3 69.1 67.9 
4E2コh 量ロ一~ 77.9 78.3 77.9 77.9 76.6 
注東京都清掃局データをもとに計算



































国 名 19801985 1990 1991 1992 1993 19941995 
カナダ 20 23 28 33 
アメリカ 22 29 34 35 
日本 48 50 50 51 51 
韓国 44 43 44 46 51 53 
オーストリア 30 37 37 66 65 
フィンランド 35 39 41 48 46 43 57 
フランス 30 35 34 34 34 36 36 38 
ドイツ 34 43 44 47 50 55 59 67 
イタリア 25 27 28 28 30 28 29 
オランダ 46 50 50 53 58 53 67 77 
スエーデン 34 43 50 57 54 
イギリス 32 28 35 36 35 33 36 35 
(B)ガラス
国 名 19801985 1990 1991 1992 1993 19941995 
カナダ 12 12 17 
アメリカ 5 20 22 23 
日本 35 47 48 52 56 
韓国 38 46 45 43 44 46 57 
オーストリア 60 64 68 76 76 
フィンランド 10 21 36 31 44 46 50 50 
フランス 26 29 41 44 46 48 50 
ドイツ 23 43 54 61 60 65 75 75 
イタリア 20 25 48 53 53 52 54 53 
オランダ 17 49 67 70 73 76 77 80 
スヱーデン 20 44 58 59 56 61 
イギリス 5 12 21 21 26 29 28 27 
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It is a classic example of a market failure that the market might not fully capture the 
costs and benefits of a transaction. The extra costs and benefits not captured by the market 
transaction are called externa1ities. In a perfect market， natural resources are used up at 
an efficient rate. But when positive or negative externalities exist， markets will not provide 
an efficient outcome. With no price to provide the proper incentives for reduction of pollut-
ing activities， the inevitable result is excessive demands on the assimilative capacity of the 
enVlronment. 
When “the failure ofmarket" exists， government may have a role in the economy. Gov-
ernment may deal with environmental externalities by imposing regulatory measures 
(the command and control approach)， taxes and granting subsidies， or issuing mar-
ketable permits. The theory of public expenditure deals with how the government should 
impose a tax to provide public goods. Musgrave and Samuelson assume two categories of 
goods: ordinary private consumption goods and collective consumption goods which al 
enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to 
no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good. 
For some public goods there may be no spatial restriction， but for others the benefits 
are confined to one community， although available at no additional cost to new residents. 
The theory of local public goods assume that goods are provided to a particular geo-
graphicallocation， and consumers decide their location with respect to the quantity and 
types of public goods provided. Tiebout suggested that if there were enough communities， 
individuals would reveal their true preference for public goods by the choice of community 
in which to live. This argument is based largely on the analogy with private goods. Munic-
ipal waste management policy is one of those local goods. 
These are several reasons why the central government may intervene: redistribution， 
externalities， and correcting inefficiencies in the local public goods equilibrium. At the 
central government level， the design of policy is now constrained by the reactions both of 
individuals and of lower-level governments. The positive theory of local decision-making 
is therefore considerably important. The decision making process is relying on the major-
ity voting assumption. Different voters have different vie 
